Detection Under Load

Detection engineering research · MITRE ATT&CK T1003.001

How much Sigma coverage survives a renamed dumping tool?

A reproducible evaluation of published Windows detections for LSASS credential dumping, measured against seven recorded implementations and then stressed with operator-controlled changes such as renaming and relocation.

Merged upstream: The benchmark's Dumpert hash-type correction was approved on 2026-09-21 and merged into SigmaHQ on 2026-09-24 as PR #6311.

Yasin Dehfouli Research artifact September 2026 Repository Merged SigmaHQ PR #6311
80published Sigma rules evaluated
7recorded LSASS-dumping implementations
354,229attack events in the primary benchmark
35 → 15published rule/capture detections after rename + relocation

Executive summary

The main finding

Published detection coverage is materially sensitive to artifacts controlled by the operator. Renaming alone removes 12 of 35 baseline rule/capture detections. Relocation removes eight more. No additional loss is observed in this selected population when PE version metadata is cleared or recorded fingerprints are rotated.

20 of 35 baseline detections disappear without changing the underlying LSASS-access behavior.
This is a result for the measured corpus and selected Sigma population, not a claim about all Sigma coverage.

Study design

From public telemetry to reproducible coverage measurements

The benchmark pins both the Sigma rule corpus and input datasets, compiles rule logic, evaluates each capture, applies cumulative operator changes, classifies misses, and then checks selected results against an independent engine.

Public telemetryrecorded Windows events
Pinned corpuscommit + archive hashes
Rule selectionATT&CK T1003.001
Baseline runpublished + authored rules
Mutation ladderrename → relocate → strip → rotate
Miss taxonomylogic vs telemetry vs scope
Cross-checkZircolite subset

Behaviour reported by the operating system is not rewritten. The mutations target operator-controlled artifacts, not the way the memory-access behavior itself is performed.

Primary experiment

Coverage falls at the cheapest attacker changes

Published rule/capture detections by cumulative mutation tier
Counts exclude authored rules.
35
T0 · baseline
23
T1 · rename
15
T2 · relocate
15
T3 · strip PE
15
T4 · rotate identity

What changes the result

−12detections after renaming
−8additional detections after relocation
0additional loss after stripping PE data
0additional loss after fingerprint rotation

T3/T4 stability applies to the selected population in this benchmark. It does not show that version-resource or fingerprint changes never matter elsewhere.

Observed failure modes

Why published coverage disappears

1

Name-dependent detections

All three published nanodump detections depend on the literal string dump. Renaming attacker-controlled artifacts reduces nanodump coverage from 3 detections to 0.

2

Directory exclusions

Process-access rules exclude common directories such as Program Files, System32 and SysWOW64. Relocating the tool into those paths suppresses coverage even when the behavioral event remains.

3

Indicator semantics

The Dumpert-specific rule records an import hash as MD5=. The recorded executable event carries that same value as IMPHASH=, causing the hash branch to miss.

Coverage interpretation

A miss is not one thing

The benchmark separates rule failures from missing data and from rules that were never intended to cover the tool used in a given capture. This prevents the result from turning into a simplistic “rules that fired vs rules that did not” score.

44Detected — at least one event matched.
207Logic miss — required telemetry existed, but the rule did not match.
273Out of scope — the rule targeted a different named implementation.
57Telemetry gap — the recording lacked the required event or field.

Total: 581 rule × capture pairs in the augmented evaluation.

Validation

Three checks reduce the chance that the result is a harness artifact

0harness-only results in the documented Zircolite cross-check subset
0Zircolite-only results in the same comparison
0count mismatches in that evaluated subset
Transfer test: the six authored rules were also run without tuning against 783,367 APT29 events across two days. Three rules fire on both days.
This is a transfer test, not a production deployment or end-to-end intrusion reconstruction.

Upstream impact

One benchmark finding was merged into SigmaHQ

Dumpert hash type correction

SigmaHQ's Dumpert rule uses MD5=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690. The repository itself and a recorded Dumpert execution identify that value as an import hash instead.

Recorded event:
MD5=69C05093EB542E1C29A556A29E74E99A
IMPHASH=09D278F9DE118EF09163C6140255C690

SigmaHQ/sigma #6311 · merged

Approved by a SigmaHQ collaborator on 2026-09-21 and merged on 2026-09-24.

View upstream pull request

Authored detections

Six rules were evaluated separately against attack and non-target telemetry

The authored rules were created after inspecting measured coverage gaps. Non-target rates below describe the eligible evaluation corpus for each technique; they are not production false-positive rates.

RuleATT&CKAttack capturesNon-target fires / 100k
LSASS Handle Request From Unexpected ProcessT1003.0017 / 71.56
Process Started From A User Download DirectoryT1204.0027 / 70.99
SeDebugPrivilege Enabled On A TokenT1134.0014 / 71.48
Remote Thread Started From Unbacked MemoryT1055.0023 / 71.02
LSASS Dump Via Comsvcs MiniDump ExportT1003.0011 / 70.00
PowerShell Script Block Calling MiniDumpWriteDumpT1003.0011 / 70.00

Scope and limitations

What this study does — and does not — establish

Seven tools is seven tools, and one lab is one lab. The mutation ladder models inexpensive operator behavior rather than replaying a second set of real intrusions. Missing telemetry in a capture is not treated as evidence that the corresponding detection logic failed.

Key limitations
  • The benchmark covers ATT&CK T1003.001, not the full Sigma ruleset.
  • The primary corpus is recorded lab telemetry rather than a production enterprise baseline.
  • Non-target event rates are useful for rejecting obviously noisy rules, not for estimating precise production false-positive rates.
  • A rule that misses this corpus may still provide useful coverage elsewhere.
  • Stability at T3/T4 applies only to the selected rule population measured here.

Reproducibility

Every public number links back to committed inputs or outputs

Source repositories are pinned to commits, capture archives are pinned by SHA-256, generated figures are derived from committed benchmark JSON, and CI checks that the report has not drifted from those files.